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The Importance of Mass Culture for Democratization 
By: James Melton 
March 24, 2003 
Abstract: 
In the last thirty years, the importance ofpolitical culture in political science has risen, 
declined, and has risen again. Although the theories ofpolitical culture have been strengthened 
and refined in this process, modern culture theorists have yet to empirically demonstrate 
culture's ability to be used as an independent variable or to make causal claims using culture. 
This paper makes an attempt to solve these empirical deficiencies in cultural theory by setting up 
what Brian Barry calls a "critical test." Using the former USSR and the post-communist 
countries in Eastern Europe, I will test two hypotheses. First, mass values and not elite 
bargaining caused the transition from communism to democracy in these countries, and second, 
these mass values were not a result of "rational self interest" or elite manipulation, but they 
formed through the interaction ofdifferent sub-cultures. The first hypothesis will be tested by a 
quantitative analysis of the relationship between mass political protest and democratization, and 
to be considered valid, the peak level ofdemocratization should follow the peak ofmass political 
protest relatively closely. The second hypothesis will be tested using a cross-tab between culture 
and indicators of democratic values from the World Values Survey. To be considered valid, 
there should be a relatively strong significant correlation with individualist and egalitarian 
cultures displaying more democratic values than fatalist or hierarch culture. From the data 
gathered, these hypotheses seem to be valid; however, economic variables seem to playa 
minimal role as well. 
The Importance of Mass Culture for Democratization 
In recent years, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of theoretical works 
dealing with political culture. In addition, there have been numerous works that have tried to 
introduce cultural variables into rational choice theory to make it a stronger theory (Chai 1997, 
Chai and Wildavsky 1994, Wildavsky 1998). These authors see culture, and political culture, as 
a way to overcome some of the problems encountered by rational choice theorists and to increase 
the explanatory power of the theory. There are even some people who go so far as to say culture 
is essential to understand how people rationally act. As stated by Chai and Wildavsky, "far from 
saying that culture is the antithesis to rationality, cultural theory states the opposite: Culture is 
essential for rationality because in many, if not most, situations rational decision making would 
be impossible without the existence of culturally based preferences and beliefs" (Chai and 
Wildavsky 1994: 164). However, before any theory of culture can be used in this regard, it must 
overcome the objections made by Brian Barry in Socialists, Economists, and Democracy. For 
example, Barry objects that Almond and Vrba used a very deterministic theory of culture in their 
work, the Civic Culture (Almond and Vrba 1963); in addition, Upset did not distinguish between 
the masses and elites (Upset 1960). These objections have been overcome by improved cultural 
theory.l However, the more empirical and methodological questions posed by Barry, like the 
how can culture theory show causality or be used as an independent variable, have not yet been 
answered (Barry 1978). The answers to these questions are essential for the future of culture 
theory in political science. 
I For example, Mary Douglas's Grid/Group analysis overcomes both of these obstacles, as will be demonstrated 
below 
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Barry criticizes tests of culture's role in the stability of democracy performed by Almond 
and Vrba, Eckstein, and Lipset during the 1960's. Although all three of the theories used by the 
authors are different, in the end, they all make the same fundamental methodological mistake: 
they can only show correlation, not causality (Barry 1978). There are two main reasons for this 
methodological dilemma. First, the authors do not set up what Barry calls "the critical test." 
These authors are all testing culture and the stability of democracy in already established 
democracies, mostly in Europe. This is a problem, because none of these authors can show that 
there was a fundamental change in culture that caused democracy to form or stabilize. The 
second reason is that in a stable democracy there are many different factors causing stability. 
Barry seems not to question the fact that culture probably does affect the stability of democracy, 
but he does not think this effect can be empirically demonstrated. Therefore, in order to test the 
relationship between culture and democracy, it is essential to set up a critical test and find a way 
to control for other independent variables that affect stability. 2 
The purpose of this paper is to solve the problems brought up by Barry and answer the 
research question Almond and Vrba, Eckstein, and Lipset all set out to answer: does political 
culture playa role in the formation and stability of democracy? The political scientists above all 
tried to explain culture's role in democracy using a cross section of countries with varying forms 
and levels of democracy, but as pointed out by Barry above, this approach has trouble indicating 
causality. Consequently, I will not take the same approach as the researchers above, but instead, 
I will attempt to set up Barry's critical test. In order to set-up a critical test for this question, the 
researcher needs to demonstrate that culture somehow changed in the transition to democracy 
and this made the country more suitable for a stable democracy, or that culture did not 
2 For a more detailed discussion and a diagram showing all the different variables that most likely affect the stability 
of democracy, see Barry 1978, p. 94. 
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necessarily change but it was the driving force behind the transition to democracy. The 
hypotheses in this paper support the latter approach. This paper will be looking at political 
culture in Eastern European countries and the former USSR between 1980 and 1995. Even 
though some might be skeptical about looking at the transition period in these countries because 
there are so many things changing all at once, it is imperative that we look at this time period for 
two reasons. During this period, many of the intervening variables Barry points out, like past 
performance of the democracy, propaganda, etc., are not present. In addition, it allows us to look 
at culture's influence on democracy before and after democracy is established. Therefore, the 
initial hypothesis to the research question above is: oppositional mass cultures caused 
democratization in Eastern Europe and the former USSR. This is a slightly different hypothesis 
than Almond and Vrba, Eckstein, or Lipset, but it is still testing the same research question in a 
similar way. 
However, because the terms political culture and democratization are not easily 
definable, these terms need to be defined to better understand what we are trying to test here. 
Consequently, we must furt~er define these terms to operationalize the above hypothesis. Let us 
start with theories of democratization that involve political culture. There are basically two 
competing theories on this issue: a top-down and a bottom-up approach. As pointed out by 
Larry Diamond, "Incorporation of the political culture variable into analyses of the emergence of 
democracy has heavily focused on the political elite" (Diamond 1993: 2). The top-down 
approach Diamond is referring to, advocated by Dahl 1971 and Rustow 1970 among others, 
states that the elites set up the "rules of the game" and these rules are passed down to the masses. 
However, as Diamond points out, these authors seem to "generally neglect or altogether ignore 
mass culture" (Diamond 1993: 11). This is a problem because the citizens are essential for a 
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legitimate democracy, and in addition, it was the masses that led the transition in many of the 
Eastern European countries. For example, the Solidarity movement in Poland led the fight for 
democracy that eventually forced open elections in 1989, and mass exodus from East Germany 
weakened the economy and political structure enough to allow for peaceful use ofmass voice, 
which led to reform and reunification ofGermany. It is for these reasons we will use a bottom 
up approach in this study, and hopefully gain a greater understanding of exactly what led to the 
end of communism in Eastern Europe and the former USSR. 
The ''mass culture" Diamond refers to above is the bottom-up approach to 
democratization that has been used by several authors when discussing the communist transition 
to democracy, (Ekiert and Kubik 1998), (Ekiert and Kubik 1999), (Grix 2000), and (Sadowski 
1993), but it is rarely discussed in terms ofpolitical culture. Under this approach, the masses 
force the elites to change to a democratic regime through various oppositional methods which 
will be discussed below. However, it is not as simple as the masses wanting change and the 
elites granting it. The masses may desire change, but opportunity may not exist so no change 
occurs (Elster 1989). Therefore, the masses need both the desire and opportunity for the 
democratic transition to occur. Opportunity and desires in this sense can be seen as two filters 
for people's actions. The first filter, opportunity, "is made up of all the physical, economic, 
legal, and psychological constraints that the individual faces" (Elster 1989: 13).3 The second 
filter, desires, "is a mechanism that determines which action within the opportunity set will 
actually be carried out" (Elster 1989: 13). This is important when looking at the differences in 
predictions between rational choice theory and culture theory, which will be discussed in more 
3 As Oberschal1 points out, opportunities are, domestic or international, and short-term and long term (Oberschal1 
1996). 
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detail later, and when looking at the reason for transition in Eastern Europe and the fonner 
USSR. 
Next, we need to decide on a theory ofpolitical culture. There are several conditions that 
must be met for any theory ofpolitical culture to be operational. The first condition is that it not 
be detenninistic, because deterministic theories of culture cannot explain change or adaptation 
among culture and, for these reasons, they are not realistic. This means that the culture of a 
person, group, or nation cannot be pre-determined, or in other words, the culture must be able to 
change. Next, since we are using a mass theory of democratization, the theory of culture that we 
use must be able to be operationalized on the mass level. Finally, for culture to either 
supplement or replace rational choice theory, as mentioned in the introduction, the theory of 
culture must allow for predictability of actions,4 and therefore, it must have a limited number of 
well-defined sub-cultures. Mary Douglas's grid/group analysis meets all three ofthese criteria,s 
and hence, it is the theory of culture that will be use throughout the rest of this paper. 6 
Now that we have defined the two important tenns in our initial hypothesis, we can ' 
derive the two hypotheses that will be tested in this paper. The first has to do with the masses. It 
states: the masses, specifically mass culture, caused democratization in the post-communist 
Eastern European countries and the former USSR, not elite bargaining. The second hypothesis 
deals with why the masses developed their attitudes towards democratization. It states: mass 
4 Although there seems to be a contradiction between a non-deterministic theory of culture and a theory of culture 
that can make accurate predictions of individual's behavior, there is none. By deterministic, I do not mean that the 
theory of culture changes as changes in the environment arise, but only that the people may move between the 
different "typologies", that will be described in more detail on pages 7-9 below, as their situation changes. 
However, once a person picks a typology, we should be able to predict quite well what there actions in various 
situations will be. 
5 For further discussion of these criteria as they relate to Mary Douglas's culture theory, please refer to Chai 1997, 
Diamond 1993, Douglas 1978, Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990, and Wildavsky 1998. 
6 Mary Douglas's grid/group analysis is often referred to as cultural theory by political scientists, see Wildavsky, 
Thompson, and Ellis 1990. 
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desires in favor of democratization were shaped by culture, not rational self-interest or elite 
manipulation. 
To review, we are essentially testing two separate things in this paper: whether culture or 
rational choice theory has more explanatory power in explaining democratization in these 
countries and whether a top-down or bottom-up approach is more suitable to the study of 
democratization in these countries. Ifboth of these hypotheses are valid, this study should 
sufficiently establish that mass culture, rather than the elites or "rational" self-interest, has an 
important explanatory role in democratization. The next section of this paper will provide an 
explanation of traditional rational choice theory and how it is inadequate to explain mass social 
movements, like the ones in the countries examined here. This will be followed by an 
explanation Douglas's grid/group analysis, how the different sub-cultures of Douglas's theory 
will act rationally, and how each of the sub-cultures will react to disappointment or failure in 
their government using Hirschman's categories of exit, voice, and loyalty. Finally, the research 
design for this paper will be explained, followed by the data analysis, and conclusions with, 
suggestions for further research in this area. 
Culture vs. Rational Choice Theory: 
The primary assumption made by rational choice theorists is that people make choices 
they expect will maximize their goals, and under a rational choice framework, these goals are 
selfish and materialistic (Chai 1997).7 Rational choice theory predicts that in order to maximize 
their utility, individuals will make decisions that are in their own rational self-interest. If people 
severely pursue their narrowly defined self-interest, this theory has strong explanatory and 
7 Although, it has been recognized that there are many different interpretations of traditional rational choice theory. 
As stated by Green and Shapiro, " ...most practitioners [of rational choice] agree on some, but not all, feature of the 
defInition of rational choice. As a result, there is no single rational choice theory or unambiguous standard for 
assigning the label 'rational choice' to a theory" (Green and Shapiro 1994: 13). However, this defInition is the one 
typically used by rational choice theorists who use a more thin approach. 
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predictability power and is easily the most parsimonious, falsifiable approach to individual 
decision-making. However, critics point out that viewing human nature as solely selfish and 
materialistic is much too simple to be realistic, and additionally, they point out that many of the 
empirical studies using the rational choice approach have led to inaccurate or indeterminate 
conclusions. For example, Green and Shapiro claim, " ...to date no innovative theoretical 
insights of rational choice theory have been subjected to serious empirical scrutiny and survived" 
(Green and Shapiro 1994: 3). 
In addition to the problems above, rational choice theory has trouble explaining mass 
behavior, which is important for explaining the mass movements in Eastern Europe and the 
former USSR. Rational choice theory predicts individual behavior, but it does not help us to 
explain the behavior of groups of individuals. As pointed out by Olson, and subsequent rational 
choice theorists, rational choice theory predicts that the formation of large groups will not occur 
without special incentives or coercion (Olson 1965), like the 70,000 individuals who gathered in 
the center of Leipzig near the end of the German Democratic Republic (McAdam, McCarty, and 
Zald 1996). Moreover, if people do enter into groups, their motivation for joining and remaining 
a member of a group is often quite different and possibly even contrary to what the group sets as 
its goals. Hence, it is nearly impossible to predict a group's actions based on the predictions of 
its individual member's actions under a rational choice framework without creating a fallacy of 
composition. This has traditionally been a critique rational choice theorists use against group 
based theories, but often, rational choice theorists who theorize about group behavior, such as the 
behavior ofthe United State's Congress, fall victim to this same trap. 
One approach that has been taken to overcome the difficulties of rational choice theory 
has been to introduce culture into the theory. The modified rational choice approach focuses on 
8 
how culture affects the expected utility from different choices by shaping preferences and 
beliefs. As stated by Wildavsky, "Rationality is culturally controlled in that individuals use their 
social [context] to filter their environment so they can select appropriate objects of attention and 
value them accordingly" (Wildavsky 1998: 200). Using this approach, self-interest could 
possibly be different for each individual, because the way they view their environment through 
their culture may be different. However, if each individual views his or her environment through 
a different cultural filter, the modified rational choice approach would lose all of its explanatory 
and predictability power. Consequently, in order for this approach to work, it is imperative to 
theorize culture in such a way that allows for predictability of actions and has a limited number 
of cultures. As mentioned above, Douglas's grid/group analysis seems like an appropriate theory 
for this task. Moreover, Douglas's theory has an even more important benefit: it allows us to 
overcome the fallacy of composition problem rational choice theory has so much trouble with. 
In order to explain mass level behavior, it is essential make this connection, and as stated above, 
rational choice theory has trouble with this step. Douglas's theory of culture overcomes this 
obstacle, because her theory allows for group oriented behavior and even puts individuals of the 
same sub-culture into the same groups. Consequently, based on a person's sub-culture, the 
researcher can determine how likely an individual is to join a group, cooperate once within a 
group, and even explain when different groups will work together. It may seem unclear how this 
all works now, but the explanation ofDouglas's theory in the next section will help clarify these 
ideas. 
Grid/Group Analysis: 
Douglas's idea of the individual is crucial to understanding her theory for grid/group 
analysis, because it is the interaction amongst individuals and between individuals and the group 
-that makes her theory so unique and compelling. It is due to these interactions that a person 
chooses a particular culture, or typology, which allows for predictability of group as well as 
individual actions. Therefore, in order to completely understand grid/group analysis, one first 
has to understand Douglas's view ofthe negotiating individual. She says, 
... the cognitive activity of the real live individual is largely devoted to building 
the culture, patching it here and trimming it there, according to the exigencies of 
the day. In his very negotiating activity, each is forcing culture down the throats 
ofhis fellow men. When individuals interact, their medium of exchange is 
culture (Douglas 1978: 6). 
This is important, because individuals interact within a certain typology that helps them interpret 
their environment and make their decisions. Therefore, when Douglas talks about individual's 
interacting through culture, she is talking about people interacting within and among typologies. 
To understand how this works and how a person chooses their typology, it is imperative to 
understand how a typology is formed. 
There are two sides to each typology: a "social context" and a "cosmology". The social 
context referred to here is "a context conceived in strictly social terms, selected for its permitting 
and constraining effects upon the individual's choices. It consists of social action, a deposit of 
myriads of individual decisions made in the past, creating a cost-structure and the distribution of 
advantages which are the context of present day decisions" (Douglas 1978: 6). In other words, 
the social context is the rules or guidelines an individual uses to make their decisions and the 
institutions that shape and hold those rules in place. Consequently, an individual's choice about 
whether or not to join a particular group with a particular typology and associated social context 
will be determined by the distribution of advantages and disadvantages that a person receives 
10 
from being a member of that particular typology, or environment, based on their past decisions.s 
Every action and decision a person makes has a cultural element to it, and as a person makes 
decisions, they are attempting to coerce and influence other individuals to become members of 
their culture with their decision making pattern. In addition, every individual is shaping their 
culture based on their particular needs of the day, but Douglas adds, individuals are also being 
shaped by their culture as well. 
Once a person is a member of a typology, the environment begins to shape the individual 
by providing a cost-structure to influence decisions. In order for an individual to interpret his 
environment and apply his social context, he needs a set of guiding principles or ideas to guide 
him. This is provided by the cosmology that is associated with each of the typologies. By 
cosmology, Douglas means "the ultimate justifying ideas which tend to be invoked as if part of 
the natural order and yet which, since we distinguish four kinds of cosmology, are evidently not 
at all natural but strictly a product of social interaction" (Douglas 1982: 5). Based on this 
definition, each cosmology is the set of ideas developed by a person for interpreting their ' 
environment and justifying their actions. In other words, a cosmology is like a cultural filter, it is 
what a person uses to perceive events that happen in their environment. 
Therefore, typologies are a direct measure of the "social context" of a group, and each of 
the social contexts has an implicit "cosmology". This is important, because when measuring 
culture theory, it is imperative to measure the social context and not the cosmology. Mary 
Douglas states, "Given these four distinctive contexts ...the next stage is to elucidate elements of 
cosmology which are not circularly implied in the definitions of social context and to show that a 
distinctive cosmological bias is generated by the character of explanations and justifications that 
g Here it is assumed that a person has a choice about what culture they belong to. There are times, especially in the 
case of the fatalist, that a person may be forced to join a group, or a person may not be allowed in the typology that 
will give them the most benefit and they chose the next best. 
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are plausible in each social context" (Douglas 1978: 22).9 Douglas uses the notion of "grid" and 
"group" to measure the social context of each typology. 10 
A person's grid and group scores determine the typology in which they have placed 
themselves. As stated by Mary Douglas in Cultural Bias, "the term grid suggests a cross-hatch 
of rules to which individuals are subject in the course of their interaction. As a dimension, it 
shows a progressive change in the mode of social control" (1978: 8). Under this view, grid 
refers to the level and type of control that members of a group are subject to in their everyday 
interaction with other members of the group and society, where maximum freedom from control 
represents a low grid condition and maximum control represents a high grid condition. I I On the 
other hand, group refers to the strength of attachment to a group. Mary Douglas says, "The 
strongest effects of group are to be found where it incorporates a person with the rest by 
implicating them together in common residence, shared work, shared resources and recreation, 
and by exerting control over marriage and kinship" (Douglas 1978: 14). Therefore, a strong 
group score would be where the group infiltrates every aspect of a person's life, and a low group 
score would be one where a person is free to come and go as he pleases with little or no time or 
allegiance given to the group. Based on how a particular group scores for these two measures, it 
is assigned one of four typologies, or subcultures, as shown below. 
9 This idea is furthered by Mary Douglas's belief that grid/group is a polythetic classification. This is a
 
classification that "identifies classes by a combination of characteristics, not requiring anyone of the defining
 
features to be present in all members of a class" (Douglas 1978: 15). Therefore, each member may not display all
 
of the characteristics of a typology, but all members should display a maj ority of the characteristics of a typology.
 
Both of these ideas are important when trying to measure culture using a grid/group framework.
 
10 The social context for each typology is most clearly laid out on pages 19-21 of Cultural Bias.
 
11 The leadership of the group can exert control internally or in the case of the fatalists control can be exerted
 
eternally from members of other groups.
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Figure 1: The Four T I . 12 
High Grid 
ypo ogles 
Fatalist Hierarchical 
Individualism EgalitarianLow Grid 
Low Group High Group 
At low grid, low group, a person is in the individualist typology. A person in this 
typology is free to negotiate amongst fellow members, choose his allies and enemies, and move 
up or down in the social ladder. At low grid, high group, a person is in the egalitarian typology. 
This typology has a strong external group boundary, but little or no segregation or division of 
roles within the groUp.13 Each member has the potential to play every role; however, fear of 
outsiders infiltrating the group is constant and can become overwhelming to members of this 
typology. At high grid, high group, a person is in the hierarchical typology. This typology has 
strong internal and external boundaries. Roles are predetermined and fixed, and everyone knows 
their place and duty in the group. Finally, at low group, high grid, a person is in the fatalist 
typology. People are sent here by members of the other typologies to do as they are told. 
Individuals in this typology do not receive the protection and privileges of group membership; 
however, they are still not free to do as they please because they are subject to the rules set down 
by their high grid environment. There are people here in all societies, and this is sometimes 
referred to as the forgotten typology. In any given society, there are individuals in all four 
typologies depending on which group they belong. This is essential, because it is the interaction 
12 For a more thorough explanation of the different typologies and their social contexts as well as their cosmologies
 
than given below, see Douglas 1978; Douglas 1982; Douglas and Ney 1998; Wildavsky 1987; Wildavsky 1998;
 
Wildavsky, Thompson, and Ellis 1990.
 
13 An outsider may see segregation, and even distinct leadership, of the group, but since egalitarian's distrust
 
inequality and power, whatever segregation exists will either be ignored or not perceived by the egalitarian group.
 
-between typologies that sets each typology apart from the others. (Douglas 1978, Douglas 1982, 
and Douglas and Ney 1998) 
Cultural Self Interest: 
In this paper we will be looking at how different typologies will react to regime 
instability and failure in government. However, before we can do this, we must know how each 
typology will rationally act in general. Douglas's theory has very direct implications for rational 
choice theory, because rationality would be defined differently for each typology. Under a 
rational choice framework, a person chooses the action out of their opportunity set that is the best 
means to maximize their utility. However, using culture theory, each person chooses the action 
in their opportunity set that best promotes their typology's values. 14 Therefore, each typology 
can have a different rational action for the same situation. This is Wildavsky's claim in his book 
Culture and Social Theory: "If, indeed, a cultural theory claims, preferences come from 
institutions, that is, from the activity of individuals in creating, sustaining, modifying, and 
rejecting relationships with others, concepts of self interest would vary with the type of 
institution being built" (Wildavsky 1998: 250). This is explicit in Chai and Wildavsky's work 
entitled "Culture, Rationality, and Violence," where they theorize how each of the different 
typologies would rationally act. Using Chai and Wildavsky's model, the rational action of each 
typology is briefly described below. 
The fatalist typology is quite distinct from all the other typologies, because this is where 
the people are pushed who do not belong to any of the other typologies. The members of this 
typology see both human and physical nature as unpredictable,15 and hence, there is no 
motivation for them to take risks or invest their resources. In addition, they have self-interested 
14 Furthennore, keep in mind that the cosmology is a way to filter their environment, so the opportunities that one
 
typology may perceive may be different than that of another.
 
15 For a further discussion of how each typology views phys ical and human nature see Douglas 1978, pages 22-40.
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preferences, because they see themselves as able to do little for their own or others welfare. 
"Given these beliefs and preferences, the behavior of fatalists is rigidly dictated by their existing 
social and economic roles, and they follow unchanging routines that have provided for survival 
in those roles in the past" (Chai and Wildavsky 1994: 164). Therefore, so long as the fatalist 
feels suppressed by the current power structure, the rational action of a fatalist is no action, but 
even though fatalists are inactive, there is a constant threat to individualists and hierarchs that 
fatalists may be recruited by the egalitarians. As Wildavsky says, "Since there is always the 
danger that egalitarianism may grow by recruiting fatalists, the establishment has an added 
incentive to placate minorities to keep down discontent" (Wildavsky 1998: 210). Hence, to 
keep the egalitarian opposition from growing, individualists and hierarchs must placate the 
fatalists into submission, so they don't abandon their apathetic fatalist stance for an oppositional 
egalitarian one. 
As stated above, individualists are low grid/low group. The people of this typology are 
bound by few rules or prescriptions and exist in a network of their own making. Individualists, 
unlike fatalists, have a generally optimistic view ofhuman and physical nature, because they are 
low grid. Consequently, "rational individualists must have a culturally detennined 
predisposition to believe that many investments will provide a return that exceeds the cost 
involved," (Chai and Wildavsky 1994: 165). Moreover, their preferences are generally se1f­
interested, like the fatalists. However, unlike the fatalists, they hold a view similar to that of 
Adam Smith, because they believe by acting in their own self-interest they will promote the good 
of all in society. As SUCh, their view of rationality best fits with the traditional assumptions of 
rational choice theory: a materialistic, selfish individual, and their decisions can be detennined 
-by a simple costlbenefit analysis. Therefore, individuals in this typology will fit under the 
traditional rational choice framework. 
The egalitarians are high group, low grid, and due to this, they are usually seen in a 
tightly clustered group with very few rules or prescriptions. The most likely way for a group like 
this to form is "if group members have shared preferences or beliefs that create special incentives 
for collective action with each other rather than with those outside the group" (Chai and 
Wildavsky 1994: 165). Due to these conditions, egalitarian groups will tend to be small groups, 
rather than large groups, because the larger the group the more likely there will be dissent which 
will cause factions to form within the group and eventually break off. 16 Since egalitarian groups 
form on the basis of shared preferences and beliefs, consensus is essential for the success of 
group, and therefore, they seek to eliminate inequality between members, whether it is inequality 
in duties, wealth, power, or material possession. In addition, they will try to recruit the less 
fortunate of society that can gain the most from increased equality, even though these members 
are unlikely to join. Keeping these ideals in mind, it seems that the egalitarian will rationally 
seek equality and the group's goals. Therefore, a rational egalitarian will pursue group goals and 
seek to eliminate inequality within their group and society. 
The hierarchists are high group like egalitarians, but they are also high grid. In this 
typology, there is a strong boundary to enter the group and between different social rankings 
within the group. People at the top of the social ladder are expected and deserve to have more 
and people at the bottom of the ladder less. Therefore, hierarchy justifies political inequality, 
16 There is a proportional relationship here between the size of the group and the level of shared preferences and 
beliefs: the larger the group the stronger the level of shared preferences and beliefs needed to sustain the 
relationship, while smaller groups will not share their preferences and beliefs as strongly. This is similar, but not the 
same, as Olson's beliefs, because here we assume that shared preferences alone are enough for group formation due 
to the egalitarian's strong group preferences, where Olson sees the need for shared preferences as well as incentives 
or punishments for mdividuals to jom a group. 
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and the parts must sacrifice for the success of the whole. Hierarchical interactions "are promoted 
by preferences that place an inherent positive value on the welfare of the group as a whole, as 
well as by preferences that place a negative value on the welfare of those outside the group" 
(Chai and Wildavsky 1994: 166). Consequently, a rational hierarchical person will make the 
decisions needed for the survival of the whole. 17 
ExitIVoice and Loyalty/Silence: 
Now, based on what was said above, let us look at how the different typologies will react 
to regime instability and failure. This is important, because it has direct ramifications on how the 
transition to democracy will begin. Albert Hirschman categorized individual's and group's 
reactions to disappointment in or failure of authority as exit, voice, and loyalty (Hirschman 
1970). Hirschman defines exit and voice as: 
...two contrasting responses of consumers or members oforganizations to what 
they sense as deterioration in the quality ofgoods they buy or the services and 
benefits they receive. Exit is the act ofsimply leaving, generally because a better 
good or service or benefit is believed to be provided by another firm or 
organization...Voice is the act ofcomplaining or of organizing to complain or to 
protest, with the intent of achieving directly a recuperation of the quality that has 
been impaired. (Hirschman 1993: 175-176) 
Hirschman defines loyalty as an opposite of exit and voice, where an individual sticks it out 
through hard times until the authority has time to tum things around (Ellis 1993). Ellis and 
Wildavsky have separately adapted Hirschman's concept of exit, voice, and loyalty into the 
grid/group framework. They both see hierarchy taking a strategy ofloyalty to the existing power 
structure, and neither one classifies the fatalist, which I believe will take a strategy of silence or 
quiescence. 18 However, they had quite different views about egalitarians and individualists. 
17 For a further discussion about how any of the typologies will act rationally, please refer to Chai and Wildavsky 
1994, pages 164-166. 
18 The fatalist could be seen as in a sense exiting, because he will not show outward support of a failing regime. He 
sees no benefit for him whether he shows support or not. He believes his situation in a new regime will be much the 
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Wildavsky saw exit as the sole strategy of the egalitarians and voice the sole strategy of 
individualists (Wildavsky 1998). Ellis, on the other hand, believed egalitarians would use both 
exit and voice, and the individualists would use voice first and exit if voice failed (Ellis 1993). 
Although these views are similar, the differences must be overcome to understand how the 
different typologies would react to a deteriorating regime. 19 
From the above, it is easy to determine that the hierarchs of society would be loyal, either 
actively or tacitly, to the existing regime under almost all circumstances, but to determine how 
individualists and egalitarians would react, it is necessary to remember how members of those 
groups rationally act. Individualists make decisions based on rational self-interest. 
Consequently, they would be most likely to follow of strategy of loyalty, voice, or exit when 
each of those is in their self-interest. If the current regime and power structure is functioning 
effectively and individualists are able to maximize their utility under the existing regime, then 
they would be loyal. However, if the current regime is failing to function properly, individualists 
would most likely exit or voice depending on which one of these strategies gave the greatest 
potential for future gain with the least costs. Alternatively, egalitarians are very unlikely to ever 
be loyal unless it is an egalitarian regime in power, because they have a strong tendency to 
oppose individualist's idea of the market and competition, and they will always oppose the 
unequal social distribution in hierarchies (Wildavsky 1998). Now considering their method of 
opposition, they are rationally supportive of their group and against inequality, and they need 
same as that under the old one. However, through not actually exiting and continuing to maintain his role in the old 
society, the fatalist is actually showing tacit consent for the old regime, and hence, his "silence" is similar to that of 
loyalty. 
19 The following discussion about the strategy of the individualists and egalitarians is important to determine the 
difference between them, but for the majority of this paper, it is enough to know that individualists and egalitarians, 
the low grid typologies, will exit or voice, while the fatalists and hierarchs, the high grid typologies, will by loyal to 
the existing regime. 
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some level ofopposition to keep their group from disintegrating. 2o Therefore, egalitarians will 
only exit if they can better oppose the existing power structure from elsewhere (Ellis 1993), and 
consequently, they will usually opt for voice. Finally, the fatalists are likely to not support any 
ofHirschman's strategies, but instead, they will most likely be apathetically loyal to the 
situation. However, as mentioned above, if the situation becomes too bad, there is the chance 
that fatalists may be recruited by the egalitarians. 
Let us consider the example of a communist country with a deteriorating regime. The 
hierarchs in this society would support the existing regime, as is the case among the ruling class, 
while the fatalists would be oblivious to the whole situation and maintain their normal lifestyle. 
For the low grid typologies, due to severe punishment of dissenters, the cost of voice will be very 
high for both egalitarians and individualists in countries like East Germany where there was 
strong and frequent use offorce against dissenters. Furthermore, the cost of exit was very high 
in countries like Poland that were surrounded by other communist countries. This is why the 
oppositional egalitarians and individualists chose to flee in East Germany, but they chose to stay 
and voice in Poland. In addition, since the egalitarians are constantly striving to increase their 
ranks, there would likely be a union between egalitarians and individualists under a common 
cause, like the Solidarity movement in Poland. This is probably the case in Poland, where all the 
opponents were unified under the Solidarity movement. Chai and Wildavsky state something 
similar to these thoughts: 
Because of the preference for equality, when egalitarian groups attempt to expand 
their boundaries to other parts of society, they often try to bring in those who have 
the most to gain from such goals, that is, those they perceive to be the least 
20 A strong leader could act as a cultural entrepreneur to keep an egalitarian group together, but as stated by Chai and 
Wildavsky, " ...any unusual accumulation of resources by a subset of group members creates differences between 
the goals of these members and those of other members. Such differences tend to weaken group boundaries, hence 
inequality must be avoided at all costs" (Chai Wildavsky 1994: 166). Therefore, a strong leader could help keep the 
group together, but it is unlikely a leader will have the ability to gain power, due to fear of inequality. 
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fortunate [in society] ...Fatalists do not believe that they can gain from joining a 
group; hierarchists are content with the group that they belong to. Individualists 
may join as long as they perceive that personal gains can be made from doing so, 
but they will leave as soon as the group's goals diverge from their own. (Chai 
and Wildavsky 1994: 166) 
This statement is one example ofhow grid/group analysis solves the fallacy of composition 
problem mentioned above. In this example, by knowing a group is egalitarian, Chai and 
Wildavsky are able to predict that it will be a small group that will need to recruit members from 
other typologies or align with other typologies to get their voice heard. This important here, 
because rational choice theory has trouble predicting which groups will align or even if 
individual groups will voice, where grid/group analysis is perfect for these types of predictions. 
It is apparent from this quote and the above analysis that the predictions of culture theory make it 
an appropriate analytical frame to explain democratization; in the next section, we will see if 
these predictions are validated empirically. 
Research Design: 
As stated in the hypotheses above, we will be looking at the role of the masses, and 
specifically mass culture, in the fall of communism in Eastern Europe and the former USSR. 
Therefore, the first thing that must be established is whether or not the masses did playa role. 
This is essentially the first reformulated hypothesis above: the masses, not elite bargaining, 
caused democratization in the post-communist Eastern European countries and the former USSR. 
To test this hypothesis, a method similar to Bratton and Van de Walle will be used. Bratton and 
Vande Walle looked at the role ofmass movements in democratization of Sub-Saharan African 
countries (Bratton and Van De Walle 1997). In their work, they use trends in political protests 
and trends in democratization throughout all the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa to demonstrate 
the role of the masses in democratization in these countries. They operationalized the masses 
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want and desire for democracy as voice through political protest, and they used the Freedom 
House indicators of Democratic Freedom as an indicator of democracy.21 To show the 
relationship between the two, they aggregated protest and the indicators of democracy 
throughout these countries and the displayed the results using a simple line graph. Next they 
looked to see that the peak for democracy followed shortly after the peakof protest. This is 
exactly what we will do in this paper. 
Mark Beissinger has collected protest data for Russia (Beissinger 2002), while Grzegorz 
Ekiert and Jan Kubik have collected it for East Gennany, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia (Ekiert 
and Kubik 1998).22 The Freedom House indicators of Democratic Freedom are used here for the 
indicator ofdemocracy (Freedom House 2002). The Freedom House rates each country on a 1-7 
scale for their level of political rights and their level of civi1liberties. These scores can then be 
averaged to give each country's overall level of democratization on a scale from 1 to 7, one 
being the highest level of democratization and seven the lowest. The protest data as well as the 
indicators for democracy in these countries will be aggregated and displayed in a line graph to 
demonstrate the relationship between mass opposition to communism and democratization. 
There are two things that are important about this graph. First, the masses importance will be 
most clearly portrayed if protest peak if followed almost immediately by the democratization 
peak. Second, it is important to see where the protest peak starts, because this is where the 
opportunity set changes and the individuals with oppositional values begin to voice their desires. 
Being that the second hypothesis is reliant on the first, it will be tested only if the first 
proves valid. The second hypothesis states: the masses attitudes in favor of democratization 
21 They used the Freedom House indicators, because of the Freedom Hoese's belief that free and open elections are
 
the first step in democratization. They, as do I, believe this is an integral part of democracy and one of the fIrst steps
 
in democratization, so these indicators are appropriate for their task of explaining democratization.
 
22 To see how the protest data was collected for these studies please see Beissinger 2002 and Ekiert and Kubik 1999.
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were shaped by culture, not rational self-interest or elite manipulation. This hypothesis will be 
much more difficult to explain, because it is a hypothesis about where the values and desires for 
democracy in the masses come from. The hypothesis states that these desires and values arise 
from culture and not rational self-interest or elite manipulation, as shown in figure 2 below. 
Therefore, hypothesis two states that step A is what leads the masses to want democracy and that 
D and E are not factors or exist only minimally. This is difficult to demonstrate for two reasons. 
First, it is the elites that give the masses the opportunity to express their desires, so it is hard to 
determine whether or not opening the opportunity set is indeed an act ofmanipulation. Second, 
rational self-interest can be reflected in a variety of ways, due the broad interpretations of 
rational choice theory, and consequently, it is hard to control for rational self-interest. 
Figure 2: Schematic of Hypothesis Tw023 
Democratization 
c/ 
B 
Elite Mass 
Opportunity 
E/ 
Desire and Values 
/ 
Cultural 
Self-Interest 
"Rational" 
Self-Interest 
To test the first part ofhypothesis two, it is important to show a connection between 
culture and democratic values. Inglehart makes a connection between mass values and 
democracy in his recent article in PS entitled "How Solid is Mass Support for Democracy-And 
23 For the purpose of this study, we will not worry about demonstrating step B, but only that steps A (hypothesis 2) 
and a combined steps B and C (hypothesis 1), where masses lead to democratization, exists. 
•
 
22 
How Can We Measure It? He demonstrates a 0.830 correlation (R2) between a survival/self 
expression index24 he created and the cumulative 1981-2000 Freedom House Index of 
Democratic Freedom for 77 countries throughout the world (Inglehart 2003). This index rates 
each person questioned on a scale from -2 to 2, 2 being the highest values that support 
democracy and -2 being the lowest, of their individual democratic values. Therefore, Inglehart's 
survival/self expression index seems to adequately represent the values that best promote 
democracy, and we can test Mary Douglas's grid/group analysis again these to see if a 
relationship between culture and values that promote democracy. To do this, we will run a 
simple cross-tab to see if there is a relationship between these values and the different typologies, 
with the oppositional, low grid typologies being more likely to hold high democratic values than 
the high grid typologies.25 In addition, since we are primarily concerned with the difference 
between low and high grid typologies,26 we will find a Pearson's R2 for the relationship between 
the survival/self-expression index and individuals grid scores. We will perfonn these tests for 
Hungary, Poland, East Germany, and Russia in the 1990 wave of the World Values Survey.27 
However, this cross-tab and correlation only shows the relationship between culture and 
democratic values, it does not tell us anything about whether rational choice theory or elite 
manipulation played a significant role. In an attempt to rule out rational choice theory, we will 
look at individual's income, using question v227 from the 1995-1997 coded World Values 
24 This index consists of questions v27 (trust people), vlO (happiness), v197 (homosexuality), vl18 (signed a 
petition), and v1000 (postmaterialist values index) from the 1995-1997 World Values survey codebook (World 
Values Survey 2000). 
25 Last semester, I ran a validity test between the different typologies and indicators chosen from the World Values 
Survey. Since the test showed the indicators were valid, I can use these indicators to come to individual respondents 
typology. For a list of the questions and how these indicators are constructed, please see appendix one. 
26 As stated before, the high grid typologies are more likely to be loyal, where the low grid typologies are most 
likely to be oppositional and demonstrate high survival/self expression scores. Hence, we will be looking for a 
positive R2 here. 
27 Some of the questions used to construct these indexes were not given at all to Slovakia and were not given in the 
1995-1997 wave to Hungary or Poland. 
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Survey Codebook (World Values Survey 2000). Income is an important variable, because it may 
be relied on and it overlaps with many other economic variables, such as property ownership, 
occupation, class, etc., that rational choice theorists would rely on to explain why it would be in 
someone's interest to oppose the communist regime. Here we will be looking for whether or not 
economic status has a strong correlation with the survival/self expression index, and if so, 
whether this relationship can be explained using cuIture or not. In addition, to help rule out and 
more conclusively determine what caused democratic values among the masses in these 
countries, we will look briefly at the masses role in East Germany and Poland to determine 
whether or not they were manipulated into opposition by the elites. 
Data Analysis: 
As stated above the first hypothesis will be tested using protest data and indicators of 
democratization from Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, East Germany, and Russia. This data is 
summarized in figure three on the next page. There are two important years indicated by figure 
three. First, 1990 is the year with the highest level ofprotest in these countries, and second; 
1991 is the year with the highest level of democratization. This supports the first hypothesis. 
Essentially, this graph indicates that the masses led to a growing level of democratization from 
1987, when the protest began, to 1990, the peak of protest activity in these countries. This was 
immediately followed by increase in democratization in 1989 to 1991, where the peak is located. 
Therefore, hypothesis one seems to be valid. 
The second important point on the graph is 1987. This is important for two reasons. 
First, the level of democratization began to increase at approximately the same time as protest 
began, which suggests democratization began as a result ofmass voice. Second, this is where 
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the protest activity began in these countries, which marks the first attempts at mass protest in 
many of these countries. 
Figure 3: Level of Democratization and Number of Protest Events 1986-1993 
(Russia, Slovakia, Poland, E. Germany, and Hungary)28 
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Before 1987, any protest that broke out was squashed by the Soviet Army or domestic 
police in these countries, but in 1987, acts ofvoice were either not as severely suppressed or 
were not suppressed at all. This marks a change in the opportunity set of the people that led to 
an increase in protest as long as this new opportunity is available. As stated by Beissinger, 
" ...the 'forces of order' in the USSR in the late 1980's and early 1990's conceived ofhow order 
should be created in a particular way, through the predictability ofrepression and the thickness 
of institutional presence rather than the harshness of force" (Beissinger 2002: 329). It is easy to 
see how through this change in the opportunity the people of the countries were allowed to 
express their democratic values and desires for the first time. Both of the points above are 
28 The protest data is summarized in Beissinger 2002 and Ekiert and Kubik 1999. In addition, the indicators of 
democratic freedom are given in Freedom House 2002. 
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important for explaining the protest and what caused these values and desires to be instilled in 
the masses, and it tends to agree not only with hypothesis one, but with the second part of 
hypothesis two: that culture, not elite manipulation, was the cause of democratization desires. 
The second hypothesis states that culture, not elite manipulation or rational self-interest, 
caused democratic values and desires for democratization to spread like wildfire through the 
people ofEastem Europe and the former USSR. As stated in the research design section above, 
Inglehart's survival/self expression index can be used to demonstrate democratic values, and 
Mary Douglas's grid/group analysis allows us to predict that egalitarians and individualists are 
more likely to support democratic values than hierarchs or fatalists. Indeed, this relationship 
does exist, as shown in the cross-tab in table 1 below. 
Table 1: Typology versus Democratic Values FavoJrable to Democracy in Russia, East 
Germany, Hungary, and Poland (1990) 
Democratic 
Values Individualist Egalitarian Fatalist Hierarchical Total 
-2 0.49% 1.60% 0.74% 
-1 21.20% 22.09% 51.42% 45.28% 30.35% 
0 52.72% 53.49% 39.18% 47.17% 48.86% 
1 22.18% 22.67% 7.45% 7.55% 17.72% 
2 3.41% 1.74% 0.35% 2.33% 
Significance= .000 Phi= .328 N= 2020 
(Inglehart 2003) 
As shown in this table, 25.59% of individualists and 24.41 % of egalitarians scored a 1 or 2 on 
the democratic values index, where 7.80% of fatalists arid 7.55% ofhierarchs scored this high. 
In addition, nearly 50% of fatalists and hierarchs scored -lor -2 on the index, where only 
around 22% of individualist and egalitarians scored this low.29 This is the relationship that is 
predicted above, because individualists and egalitarians are most likely to take strategies of exit 
29 This relationship is even stronger in the 1995-1997 wave of the World Values survey, which indicates the strength 
of the loyalty to the previous regime among fatalists and hierarchs. Although, this strength may have disappeared if 
democracy and the free market would have better demonstrated their ability during the period between 1990 and 
1995. 
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and voice (oppositional strategies in support of democracy) in the case of a failing regime, where 
fatalists and hierarchs are more likely to take loyalist positions in support of the existing regime 
and against democracy. This table shows a significant relationship as well as a medium to high 
correlation with a phi of .328. In addition, when we use Pearson's R2 to test the correlation 
between grid score and survival/self expression score, we get a significant .336 correlation, 
which is about medium level. This is in the right direction, because we predict a low grid score 
should lead to a low survival/self expression score.30 Therefore, the relationship we 
hypothesized does seem to exist. 
However, there may be objections that there is actually another variable causing this 
relationship, like a spurious relationship or indirect causation, and if we controlled for that other 
variable, we would lose the relationship between democratic values and culture above. This is a 
hard objection to overcome, because even though we chose the transition period to eliminate 
many of the political variables that be intervening, there are still lots of economic variables that 
could be intervening, as would likely be posited by rational choice theorists and economists. 
One way to test this objection is to look at the relationship between democratic values and an 
economic variable, like income, as shown by table 2 on the next page. Although there is not 
much of a relationship in this chart, there seems to be a slight decrease in democratic values as 
income increases. There are slightly more upper income people who have democratic values 
equal to one than lower income people, and slightly more lower income people who have 
democratic values equal to 0 or -1 than upper income people. 
30 This may not seem quite correct, but the grid score is an ordinal rank from 0-1 with low grid being between 0 and 
0.5 and high grid between 0.5 and 1. In addition, when calculating the survival self-expression index, we get an 
interval score from 1.5 to 5, which 2 equaling 1.500 to 2.208 and -2 equaling 4.302-5.000. The Pearson's 
correlation was decided upon, because it is a correlation between two interval sets of data. Consequently, R2 is used 
to dispel any objections that information may have been lost when the grid and group scores were broke into 
nominal data and the survival/self expression index were broke into ordinal rankings. Indeed, it does not look like 
we lost any information by doing this, because the Phi and R2 are nearly identical. 
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Table 1: Income versus Democratic Values Favorable to Democracy in Russia, East 
Germany, Hungary, and Poland (1990) 
Democratic 
Values 
Lowest 
Decile 
of 
Income 
(1) 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Highest 
Decile 
of 
Income 
(10) 
-2 0.9% 0.4% 0.3% 0.5% 0.6% 0.7% 1.1% 0% 1.1% 1.5% 
-1 24.4% 27.6% 27.8% 33.7% 37.5% 27.2% 25.5% 24.4% 19.6% 19.7% 
0 56.7% 48.5% 52.8% 50.3% 45.3% 52.5% 50.2% 51.9% 50.0% 48.5% 
1 15.7% 22.2% 17.4% 13.4% 14.8% 17.4% 21.5% 22.1% 28.3% 19.7% 
2 2.3% 1.3% 1.7% 
-
2.1% 1.8% 2.1% 1.8% 1.5% 1.1% 10.6% 
Significance= .000 Phi= .171 N= 2681 
(Inglehart 2003) 
Although the above relationship is not strong, it must be accounted for by culture in order 
for hypothesis two to be valid. In order to do this, we need to run a cross tab that tests culture 
versus democratic values, but controls for income.3l This cross tab gives the following 
correlations and significance levels for each income level. 
Table 3: Significance Level and Phi for the Typologies and Democratic Values at Each 
Income Level in Poland, Hungary, East Germany, and Russia (1990) 
Income Level (in Deciles) Significance Phi 
1 .029* .379 
2 .176* .310 
3 .002 .350 
4 .003 .326 
5 .000 .357 
6 .000 .387 
7 .001 .396 
8 .008* .411 
9 .060* .511 
10 .761 * .396 
* IndIcates an N of less than 200 for that decIle 
(Inglehart 2003) 
For every level of income, there is a correlation above .3, even though some are insignificant due 
to a low N. In addition, analysis of the cross tab for every level of income indicates that the 
31 This actual cross tab was too large and confusing to display in the paper, but it is given in appendix 2. 
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relationship is as predicted above: individualists and egalitarians are more likely to have values 
that support democracy than fatalists or hierarchs. However, there is a little variation with the 
strength of this relationship throughout the different income deciles. For example, for the 4th 
decile around 17% of individualists and egalitarians had democratic values equal to one or two, 
where in the 7th decile over 30% of individualists and 23.1 % ofegalitarians had democratic 
values equal to one or two. However, this variation is minimal. Therefore, it can be concluded 
that income has a very slight impact on democratic values, but this does not negate the impact of 
culture on these values. 
In addition to economic variables, there are some who would argue that the elites who 
oppose communism are manipulating the masses to protest against the current regime. This is 
similar to Przeworski's argument. He seems to claim there is friction among the elites on both 
sides, and the only way for democratization to occur is through manipulation and control of the 
masses and radical elites that support the radicals and hardliners (Przeworski 1991). However, 
when we look at the transition in these countries this does not seem to be the case. As pointed 
out earlier, the change in opportunity after 1987 allowed people to voice their already held values 
and desires. There is evidence of this in many countries. The best examples are in Poland where 
the Solidarity movement began during the period ofmartial law in the early 1980's to voice 
oppositional values from the underground (Sadowski J. 993). Then, in 1989, the Solidarity 
movement finally was brought above ground to sweep the first open elections since communist 
rule began.32 This is an excellent example ofhow values can be transformed into action given an 
opportunity. Another example is in East Germany. Here the Berlin wall was built to stop exit, 
which was severely hurting the economy and weakening the communist regime there. This 
32 It is also interesting that voting was used to overcome communist rule in Poland, because a common method of 
voice among individualists is voting, rather than violent opposition or mass protest (Ellis 1993). 
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worked very well until 1989, when communism began to falter in East Germany's neighbors. 
Then the East German citizens were able to go through other formerly communist neighbors in 
order to exit into West Germany. This is yet another example of how values were constrained by 
opportunity, but they were let show after a change in circumstance allowed for a new opportunity 
set. Both of these cases demonstrate how the democratic values were present in Eastern Europe 
and the former USSR long before the opportunity set charlged to allow individuals to advance 
their values and desires. This seems to refute the objection that is was truly elite manipulation 
that caused the masses to protest. Therefore, hypothesis two seems to be valid to the extent that 
the data demonstrates that culture was definitely important, but as demonstrated above, economic 
factors seem to play at least a minimal role as well. 
Conclusion: 
To review, the data collected supports the validity ofhypothesis one that the masses 
played a role in democratization, and even though the data demonstrated that economic variables 
did playa role, the data supports hypothesis two in the sense that it points to cultural factors as 
important to help explain the values and desires that masses have. There are a couple of things 
to note though. First, little can be said about causation with this research design and the results 
given. The most that I am willing to say based on these results is that culture definitely did play 
a role in the transition to democracy, but we cannot determine is this was a big or small role or if 
it differed between countries based on the tests performed here. If the 1980 wave of the World 
Values Survey had included Eastern European countries looked at here, the evidence in support 
of culture would have been much stronger, because we would have a cross section before, 
during, and after the transition to democracy. However, we do not know what the attitudes ofthe 
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people or their political culture was before the transition, so we cannot say to what extent culture 
caused democracy. 
Second, there is no guarantee that a third variable is not causing both democratization and 
culture, giving a spurious relationship in the data presented here. I controlled for income in 
hopes that it would overlap with a wide range of other economic variables that rational choice 
theorists might posit, and I attempted to demonstrate that elites were not somehow manipulating 
the situation. Moreover, the data was gathered during the transition period, so many of the 
democratic stability variables were not present. However, despite all these variables that are 
controlled for, I cannot ensure that another variable has not been overlooked that may explain the 
relationship that is apparent in the evidence presented here, but there is probably never a case 
when ALL the variables can be controlled for. Consequently, I think it is fair to conclude that 
the data presented and controls presented here strongly supports the claim I have made 
throughout the paper: culture has a role in explaining bottom-up democratization. 
In addition, rational choice theory was only tested against culture in a simple cross-tab. 
Although it looked like culture played a much larger role than rational choice theory in the cross­
tab, it is hard to tell from this simple analysis which factor had a larger impact on 
democratization. A great deal could be added to 'Lhis study ifmore sophisticated statistical 
techniques were used, like a regression, but there are problems with this. Indeed, regressions 
have been used to demonstrate the explanatory power of rational choice over culture theory 
(Whitefield and Evans 1999), but for the two reasons below, culture has never fared well. For 
one, grid/group analysis is a bi-dimensional theory, and ifwe separate these to give one grid and 
one group score, we are losing the interaction between these variables. However, when we 
aggregate them, we only have four nominal categOlies, so we could only use a series of dummy 
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variables to demonstrate culture effect. Second, rational choice theory often gives vague, 
ambiguous, or conditional predictions, and they often will overlap with culture theory's 
predictions. As stated by Green and Shapiro, " ... constructions of rational choice theory that 
predict X and not-X creates vexing problems for those seeking to compare the performance of 
rational choice models against competing theories. The predictions of one rational choice model 
will invariably overlap with those derived from another kind of theory" (Green and Shapiro 
1994: 37). Therefore, one step for further research would be to use more sophisticated statistical 
techniques for testing culture that helps determine how large or small its role is in explaining 
democratization, or any political behavior. 
Moreover, the generalizability ofthe claims made here is quite limited. At the very least, 
it is limited to Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, East Gennany, and Russia. However, since all of the 
examples I have given are from East Germany and Poland, some may believe these hypotheses 
are only generalizable to these two countries. As many post-communist scholars have pointed 
out, there is no universal approach to explain the transition to democracy in the post-commUnist 
countries of Eastern Europe and the former USSR, and I am not trying to come up with one here. 
The argument here is simply that mass culture did playa role, at the very least in East Germany 
and Poland, and it needs to be at least considered in all countries to adequately be able to explain, 
and maybe someday predict, democratization. 
Finally, there are some, like Ian Shapiro, that will make the claim I focus too much 
attention on "the framework rather than on what is to be studied" (Shapiro 1998: 41). This may 
be true, but I do not change the theory and make post hoc theorizations to accommodate for 
anomalies in the data. I simply picked a problem that I did not believe had been adequately 
explained by rational choice theorists and demonstrated how culture theory could add to our 
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understanding of this phenomenon. This is a completely valid approach to doing political 
science research, especially at the theory building stage. 
Although the four criticisms that are pointed out above are important and need to be 
improved on by future research, they do not detract from point of this study. The point here was 
to demonstrate culture's role in explaining political phenomenon, and disprove the objections 
made by Barry, and we can conclude that culture can indeed be used in as an independent 
variable and, given the proper methodology and the correct theory of culture, it can help us 
understand what causes political phenomena. There is mucn further research that can be done on 
this topic. As suggested above, one major step would be to use more sophisticated statistical 
techniques in culture research. This will allow researchers to better demonstrate causality and 
test many competing theories to come up with the best theOly for explaining various phenomena. 
Second, research could be done on a larger number of countries throughout the world. This 
would allow for greater generalizability of the approach used here. Finally, and maybe most 
importantly, political culture needs to start being studied over time. This will allow for greater 
causal claims and possibly predictions about when democratization, or just general regime 
transition, will occur. Through this research, culture win hopefully be considered, once again, as 
a valid method in political research, and this will give political scientists everywhere one more 
tool to use to help us explain political phenomena "throughout the world. 
-1 
Appendix 1 : Grid/Group Measures l 
Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your 
views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left, 10 
means you agree completely with the statement on the right, or you can choose any 
number in between. 
v127. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
The government should take more People should take 
responsibility to ensure that more responsibility 
everyone is provided for for providing for 
themselves 
Group Score 
+10 +9 +8 +7 +6 +5 +4 +3 +2 +1 
v129. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
In the long run, hard Hard-Work doesn't 
work usually brings a better generally bring 
life success-it's more a 
matter of luck and 
connections 
Group Score 
+0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7 +8 +9 
v130. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
People can only get rich Wealth can grow so 
at the expense of others there's enough for 
everyone 
Group Score 
+9 +8 +7 +6 +5 +4 +3 +2 +1 +0 
v66. Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, 
and other people feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens to 
them. Please us the scale to indicate how much freedom of choice and control 
you feel you have over the way your life turns out. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
None at all A Great Deal 
Grid Score 
1 Variable numbers are from the 1995-1997 coded World Values Survey available on the ICPSR database, 
see Inglehart 2000. For a detailed discussion of the validity of the indicators please see "Measuring Culture 
and Cultural Change" by James Melton in Illinois Wesleyan's undergraduate researchjoumal Res Publica. 
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+9 +8 +7 +6 +5 +4 +3 +2 +1 +0 
Now I'd like you to look at this card. I'm going to read out some different forms of 
political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me for each one, whether you 
have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it, or would never, under 
any circumstance do it. 
v118. Sign a Petition have done might do would never do 
v119. Join in boycotts have done might do would never do 
v120. Attending a lawful demonstration have done might do would never do 
v121. Joining Unofficial Strikes have done might do would never do 
v122. Occupying building or structures have done might do would never do 
Group Score 
For answers of "have done," "a" adds + I, "b" adds +2, "c" adds +3, "d" adds 
+4, and "e" adds +5. For answers of "might do," "a"-"e" all add + I 
Grid Score 
For answers of "would never do," "a" adds +5, "b" adds +4, "c" adds +3, "d" 
adds +2, and "e" adds +I. 
Now I want to ask you some questions about your outlook on life. Each card I show you 
has two contrasting statements on it. Using the scale listed, could you tell me where you 
place your own view? I means you agree completely with the statement on the left, 10 
means you agree completely with the statement on the right, or you can choose any 
number in between. 
v13!.	 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
One should be careful about You will never 
making major changes achieve much in life 
unless you act boldly 
Grid Score 
+9 +8 +7 +6 +5 +4 +3 +2 +1 +0 
v132.	 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Ideas that have stood the test New Ideas are 
Of time are generally best generally better than 
old ones 
Group Score 
+9 +8 +7 +6 +5 +4 +3 +2 +1 +0 
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v95.	 If someone said that individuals should have the chance to enjoy complete 
sexual freedom without being restricted, would you tend to agree or disagree? 
Grid Score 
1. tend to agree +0 
2. neither/it depends +3 
3. tend to disagree +9 
Total Possible Grid Points- 42 points 
Total Possible Group Points-51 points 
World Values Survey Indicator Scores 
Grid Score=Grid Score/Total Possible Grid Points 
Group Score=Group Score/Total Possible Group Score 
- .
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Appendix 2 
Table 1: Typology versus Democratic Values Favorable to Democracy in Russia, East Germany, 
Poland, and Hun2arv, ControUin2 for Income in Deciles (1990) 
Income (in Democratic 
deciles) Values Individualist Egalitarian Fatalist Hierarchical Total 
1 -2 0.00% 0.00% 4.08% 0.00% 1.26% 
-1 17.71% 10.00% 38.78% 75.00% 25.16% 
0 60.42% 50.00% 44.90% 25.00% 54.09% 
1 19.79% 40.00% 10.20% 0.00% 17.61% 
2 2.08% 0.00% 2.04% 0.00% 1.89% 
Sionificance= 0.029 Phi= 0.379 N= 159 
2 -2 0.00% 0.00% 1.79% 0.00% 0.59% 
-1 21.00% 30.00% 35.71% 50.00% 27.06% 
0 45.00% 50.00% 53.57% 25.00% 47.65% 
1 32.00% 20.00% 8.93% 25.00% 23.53% 
2 2.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.18% 
Sionificance= 0.176 Phi= 0.31 N= 170 
3 -2 0.00% 0.00% 1.45% 0.00% 0.40% 
-1 19.86% 26.92% 50.72% 37.50% 29.72% 
0 54.79% 53.85% 39.13% 62.50% 50.60% 
1 21.23% 19.23% 8.70% 0.00% 16.87% 
2 4.11% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2.41% 
Sionificance= 0.002 Phi= 0.35 N= 249 
4 -2 1.14% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.71% 
-1 27.84% 13.79% 53.73% 70.00% 34.04% 
0 52.84% 68.97% 38.81% 30.00% 50.35% 
1 15.34% 17.24% 7.46% 0.00% 13.12% 
2 2.84% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.77% 
Sionificance= 0.003 Phi= 0.326 N= 282 
5 -2 0.53% 0.00% 1.69% 0.00% 0.84% 
-1 26.46% 33.33% 57.63% 7.14% 36.69% 
0 49.74% 44.44% 33.90% 78.57% 45.10% 
1 19.58% 19.44% 6.78% 14.29% 15.13% 
2 3.70% 2.78% 0.00% 0.00% 2.24% 
Sionificance= 0 Phi= 0.357 N= 357 
6 -200.00% 0.53% 0.00% 2.22% 0.00% 0.97% 
-1 20.11% 10.71% 53.33% 66.67% 29.35% 
0 57.14% 60.71% 37.78% 33.33% 51.61% 
1 17.99% 25.00% 6.67% 0.00% 15.16% 
2 4.23% 3.57% 0.00% 0.00% 2.90% 
Significance= 0 Phi= 0.387 N= 310 
7 -2 0.69% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.48% 
-1 15.97% 30.77% 54.35% 42.86% 26.19% 
0 52.08% 46.15% 41.30% 42.86% 49.05% 
1 28.47% 23.08% 4.35% 14.29% 22.38% 
2 2.78% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.90% 
Sionificance= 0.001 Phi= 0.396 N= 210 
•
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Income (in Democratic 
deciles) Values Individualist Egalitarian Fatalist Hierarchical Total 
8 -2 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
-1 21.43% 10.00% 54.17% 0.00% 27.88% 
0 57.14% 50.00% 29.17% 0.00% 50.00% 
1 21.43% 30.00% 12.50% 0.00% 20.19% 
2 0.00% 10.00% 4.17% 0.00% 1.92% 
Sianificance= 0.008 Phi= 0.411 N= 104 
9 -2 0.00% 0.00% 7.14% 0.00% 1.28% 
-1 13.33% 33.33% 35.71% 100.00% 19.23% 
0 48.33% 0.00% 57.14% 0.00% 47.44% 
1 36.67% 66.67% 0.00% 0.00% 30.77% 
2 1.67% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.28% 
Significance= 0.06 Phi= 0.511 I'J= 78 
10 -2 2.38% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.89% 
-1 16.67% 0.00% 33.33% 100.00% 20.75% 
0 38.10% 100.00% 44.44% 0.00% 39.62% 
1 26.19% 0.00% 22.22% 0.00% 24.53% 
2 16.67% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 13.21% 
Significance= 0.761 Phi= 0.396 N= 53 
•
 
vi 
Works Cited 
Almond, Gabriel A., and Sidney Vrba. The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and 
Democracy in Five Nations. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963. 
Barry, Brian. Sociologists, Economists, and Democracy. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1978. 
Beissinger, Mark R. Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 
Bratton, Michael and Nicolas Van De Walle. Democratic Experiments in Africa: 
Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997. 
Chai, Sun-Ki. "Rational Choice and Culture: Clashing Perspectives or Complementary 
Modes of Analysis." Culture Matters. Eds. Richard Ellis and Michael 
Thompson. Boulder: Westview Press, 1997: 45. 
Chai, Sun-Ki, and Aaron Wildavsky. "Culture, Rationality, and Violence." Politics, 
Policy, & Culture. Eds. Dennis Coyle and Richard Ellis. Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1994: 159. 
Dahl, Robert A. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1971. 
Diamond, Larry, ed. Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries. 
Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993. 
Douglas, Mary. Cultural Bias. London: Royal Anthropological Institute, 1978. 
Douglas, Mary. "Introduction to Grid/Group Analysis." Essays in the Sociology of 
Perception. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982. 
Douglas, Mary, and Steve Ney. Missing Persons: A Critique of the Social Sciences. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998. 
Eckstein, Harry. "Social Science as Culture Science, Rational Choice as Metaphysics." 
Culture Matters. Eds. Richard Ellis and Michael Thompson. Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1997: 21. 
Ekiert, Grzegorz, and Jan Kubik. "Contentious Politics in New Democracies: East 
Gem1any, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, 1989-1993." World Politics. 50.4, 
1998: 547. 
• 
vii ~ 
Ekiert, Grzegorz, and Jan Kubik. Rebellious Civil Society: Popular Protest and 
Democratic Consolidation in Poland, 1989-1993. Ann Arbor: The University of 
Michigan Press, 1999. 
Ellis, Richard 1. American Political Cultures. New York: Oxford University Press, 
1993. 
Elster, Jon. Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989. 
Freedom House. Freedom in the World Country Ratings, 1972-1973 to 2001-2002 
[computer file]. Freedom House Website. Washington D.C.: Freedom House, 
2002. < http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/FHSCORES.xls>. 
Green, Donald P., and Ian Shapiro. Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique 
of Applications in Political Science. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994. 
Grix, Jonathan. The Role of the Masses in the Collapse of the GDR. New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 2000. 
Hirschman, Albert O. Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, 
Organizations, and States. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970. 
Hirschman, Albert O. "Exit, Voice, and the Fate of The German Democratic Republic: 
An Essay in Conceptual History." World Politics. 45, January 1993: 173. 
Inglehart, Ronald. "How Solid is Mass Support for Democracy-And How Can We 
Measure Iti'" PS: Political Science and Politics. 36.1, January 2003: 51. 
Inglehart, Ronald et al. World Values Surveys and European Values Surveys, 1981­
1984, 1990-1993, and 1995-1997 [Computer File]. ICPSR Version. Ann Arbor, 
MI: Institute for Social Research [producer], 2000. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter­
University Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2000. 
Lipset, Seymour Martin. Political Man; The Social Bases of Politics. Garden City: 
Doubleday, 1960. 
Oberschall, Anthony. "Opportunities and Framing in the Eastern European Revolts of 
1989." Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: PoliticalOpportunties, 
Mobilizi.lliLStructures, and Cultural Frames. McAdam, Doug, John McCarthy, 
and 1\1ayer Zald, eds. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996: 93. 
Olson, Mancur. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of 
Groups. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965. 
-V111 
Przeworski, Adam. Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in 
Eastern Europe and Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991. 
Rustow, Da:rl(wart A. "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model." 
Comparative Politics 2, April 1970: 357. 
Sadowski, Christine M. "Autonomous Groups as Agents of Democratic Change in 
Communist and Post-Communist Eastern Europe." Political Culture and 
Democracy in Developing Countries. Ed. Larry Diamond. Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1993: 163. 
Shapiro, Ian. "Can the Rational Choice Framework Cope with Culture?" PS: Political 
Science and Politics. 31.1, March 1998: 40. 
Thompson, Micael, Richard Ellis, and Aaron Wildavsky. Cultural Theory. Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1990. 
Whitefield, Stephen, and Geoffrey Evans. "Political Culture Versus Rational Choice: 
Explaining Responses to Transition in the Czech Republic and Slovakia." British 
Journal of Political Science. 29, 1999: 129. 
Wildavsky, Aaron. "Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A Critical 
Thtory of ?'reference Formation." The American Political Science Review 81.1, 
March 1987: 3. 
Wildavsky, Aaron. Culture and Social Theory. Eds. Sun-Ki Chai and Brendon 
Swedlow. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1998. 
